By Michael Gallagher

So, the nation is (far from) convulsed by the two referendums that will take place on Friday, the ‘family amendment’ and the ‘care amendment’. (Of course, these could be seen as merely the warm-up before the really big referendum of the year, the eagerly-awaited vote on the Unified Patent Court that’s due to take place on the same day in June as the local and European elections.)

Uncertainty as to the outcomes is higher than usual. The issues at stake are somewhat ill defined; the consequences of a Yes vote for either amendment are disputed, with different observers able to discern positive or negative consequences in each case and others maintaining, with disappointment or relief, that little if anything will change if the amendments are made.

Even though there are two separate referendums, we can expect a strong correlation between the voting patterns: the great majority of voters, it seems likely, will vote Yes–Yes or No–No. That’s reminiscent of the referendums of December 1972, when referendums were held on the same day on removing the ‘special position’ of the Catholic church from the constitution and on lowering the voting age from 21 to 18: two completely different issues that, constituency by constituency, elicited practically identical responses from the electorate (overall 84.6% in favour of lowering the voting age and 84.4% supporting removing the ‘special position’ clause). An underlying dimension of ‘modernisation versus the status quo’ would explain that pattern.

In the case of the March 2024 referendums, there isn’t quite the same overarching factor at work; the closest candidate would be the familiar liberal–conservative cleavage that has expressed itself at, most recently, the 2015 same-sex marriage referendum and the 2018 abortion referendum. Reactions to Friday’s referendum proposals undoubtedly relate to this cleavage, with a number of those who opposed liberalisation in 2015 and 2018, including the Catholic church, coming out in favour of a No–No this time. The situation is rather more complicated than that, though, as the strong relationship with age that we saw in 2015 and 2018, with younger voters much more in favour of change than older voters, doesn’t appear to be present this time. The Red C poll from mid-February found only a weak relationship between age and referendum voting intention – though the relationship between age and actual vote, to be discovered in post-referendum analysis, may differ from this. And the debate has shown that not all of those advocating a No vote have reached this decision from a conservative perspective.

Such polls as have been conducted suggest, at first sight, a comfortable Yes majority in both votes, but the pollsters are at pains to emphasise that many voters are at best undecided. Much support for Yes in particular is soft; not all of those indicating support at this stage will vote Yes on the day, and if the undecideds come off the fence they may well do so predominantly on the No side.

Indeed, it’s striking how many different considerations there are that might lead people to vote No, including:

i Those who welcome the ‘recognition’ given to the role of mothers and to women’s work in the home by the current Article 41.2 and oppose its removal;

ii Those who see the broadening of the definition of the family in Article 41 as, in effect, devaluing the importance of the institution of marriage;

iii Those who are suspicious of the ‘political establishment’ (a term that includes most of the opposition as well as the government) and are disposed to oppose pretty much any project that the great and the good seem to want them to back;

iv Those who have heard suggestions that one or other of the changes might have implications for immigration, polygamy, inheritance, social welfare or taxation and, even if sceptical as to whether there’s really any substance to any of those claims, lacking the time to investigate thoroughly, will follow the maxim ‘if you’re not sure, vote No’;

v Those who would prefer the care amendment to follow the recommendation of the Citizens’ Assembly and confer justiciable rights upon those with caring responsibilities and intend to reject the current proposal because it falls short of what they want. It’s understandable that the insipid wording of the amendment, to the effect that the state will ‘strive to support’ family carers, has caused disappointment among those who hoped to see a definite commitment by the state to provide such support itself. Though also understandable that any government would be hesitant about inserting into the constitution a clause that would probably result in every budget being challenged in the courts with the judiciary thus compelled, very reluctantly (given its pattern of respect for the principle of the separation of powers), to determine whether the government must reallocate its spending under the different headings. Parallels come to mind with the 2002 abortion referendum, proposing the restriction of the availability of abortion; most conservatives backed it but a small absolutist group, which turned out to be crucial in defeating the proposal, opposed it on the ground that they wanted abortion banned completely, not merely restricted, and they hoped that the defeat of the ‘restrict’ proposal would trigger a fresh referendum in which a complete ban would be an option. Of course, that never happened. Whether the defeat of the current care proposal would really lead to the emergence at a later stage of an amendment conferring justiciable rights upon carers is, shall we say, uncertain.

Whether the combined effect of these motivations will outweigh the number of somewhat lukewarm Yes votes remains to be seen.

In summary, despite the caveats and the added complexities, the likelihood is that the pattern of support for Yes and No won’t depart greatly from the liberal–conservative cleavage. The first handful of constituency results on Saturday should tell us how closely voting on Friday reflects this cleavage. The touchstone, then, would be the 2018 referendum on repealing the eighth amendment. On that occasion, 66.4 per cent took the liberal side. When the first constituency result comes in on Saturday, if the Yes percentage is within around 11 per cent of the Yes vote there in 2018, the likelihood is that the outcome will be Yes–Yes. If it’s 21 points or more below the 2018 Yes vote, a No–No outcome can be expected. If it’s more than 11 but fewer than 21 points below the 2018 Yes vote, it could be a long day.