The influential judge from the Southern District of New York spoke about the flawed rationale for non-prosecution of offences related to the Global Economic Crisis. Judge Rakoff explained, as far as he is aware, the Department of Justice in the US has taken the position that no crime was committed in connection with the events leading up to the financial crisis. Their public position is that they could not indict for three reasons, some of which may be familar to the Irish case.

The first claim is that they cannot prove knowledge and intent at a senior management level. The second reason that the DoJ has given is that there were no immediate victims, in the sense that the purchasers of the sub-prime securities were themselves sophisticated investors. The third argument offered by the DOJ is that the institutions themselves are too big to fail and criminal actions would undermine confidence in a very uncertain financial market.

A podcast of his speech can be found at the CLMR website.

Nathan Lynch of Thomson Reuters,  Of Crimes and Crises: Prosecutorial Imperatives and Political Conflicts, report  of Judge Rakoff’s speech.

Adrian Kavanagh, 19 May 2013 

Opinion polls in the first half of 2013 have all pointed towards significant gains in Fianna Fail support levels, albeit to varying degrees, leaving Fianna Fail at its highest support level in opinion polls since the IMF-EU bailout in November 2010 and with some of these positioning it as the most popular party in the state ahead of Fine Gael. The latest Sunday Independent-Millward Brown poll (19th May 2013) continues in this vein, putting national support levels for the main political parties/groupings as follows: Fine Gael 23% (down 1%), Labour 12% (NC), Fianna Fail 26% (down 1%), Sinn Fein 19% (up 3%), Independents and Others 18% (NC), Green Party 2% (down 1%). My constituency-level analysis of these poll figures estimates that party seat levels, should such national support trends be replicated in an actual general election, would be as follows: Fianna Fail 53, Fine Gael 40, Sinn Fein 26, Independents and Others 22, Labour 16, Green Party 0.

The analyses used here are similar to previous posts which have applied a constituency level analysis (although with these using the constituency units used for the 2011 General Election) based on assigning seats on the basis of constituency support estimates and simply using a d’Hondt method to determine which party wins the seats, while also taking account of the factors of vote transfers and vote splitting/management (based on vote transfer/management patterns observed in the February 2011 election). Based on such an analysis and using the new constituency units (as defined in the 2012 Constituency Commission report) - the new constituencies which will be used for the next general election (assuming an election is not called in the following months before the Electoral Act putting the new constituency configuration into effect) – these analyses estimates what party seat levels would be, should such national support trends be replicated in an actual general election. These analysis suggests that Fianna Fail would seem to be the party most likely to be positively effected by the redrawing of the constituency boundaries and suggests that the party, in this context, would be gaining as a result of the boundary changes, in addition to the party’s improvement in its opinion poll levels relative to its 2011 General Election figures, irrespective of the impact of a reduction in Dail seat numbers from 166 to 158.

Due to unusually high/low support levels for some parties or political groupings in the previous election, the model may throw up occasional constituency predictions that are unlikely to pan out in a “real election”, but the estimates here cannot be seen as highly accurate estimates of support levels at the constituency level as in a “real election” party support changes will vary significantly across constituency given uneven geographical shifts in support levels. But the ultimate aim of the models are to get an overall, national-level, estimate of seat numbers and these are based on the proviso that an over-prediction in one constituency may be offset by an under-prediction in another constituency.

I have made some further corrections to the base support figures for the different parties for this analysis to take better account of the impacts on support of the 2012 Constituency Commission report boundary changes with especial reference to the Dublin constituencies. For instance, these figures better reflect the weaker positions of Fine Gael and Fianna Fail in Dublin Central after the moving out of the Ashtown area to Dublin West and the Botanic/Drumcondra area to Dublin North West, but also their stronger positions in Dublin West and Dublin North West.

Fine Gael are assigned an extra seat in Dun Laoghaire on the basis that the Ceann Comhairle, Sean Barrett, will be automatically returned at the next general election and this constituency will effectively be rendered a three-seat contest at the next general election.

****************************************

The constituency support estimates based on the Millward Brown-Sunday Independent poll figures, when using the new constituency units (as used for the next general election), are as follows:

Based on these constituency estimates and using a d’Hondt method to determine which party wins the seats in a constituency, the party seat levels are estimated as follows:

These estimates also need to take account of the candidate and competition trends unique to the different constituency. Amending the model to account for seats that may be won or lost on the basis of estimates here being based on support levels derived due to a large/small number of candidates contesting the election in 2011 or one candidate polling especially well in that election, vote transfers and vote management (e.g. discrepancies between votes won by party front runners and their running mates which would see potential seat wins fall out of a party’s hands), the seat allocations across the constituencies would look more like this:

Based on these seat estimates, a Fine Gael-Labour alliance (combined seat level of 56 seats) would not have a sufficient number of seats to command a bare majority in the Dail (79 seats in a 158 seat Dail, assuming a TD from another political grouping would take on the role of Ceann Comhairle) but a potential Fianna Fail-Sinn Fein (combined seat level of 79 seats) alliance would just about have those numbers. Of course, a Fianna Fail-Fine Gael coalition government, based on these seat estimates would command a very strong Dail  Emajority (with a combined seat level of 93 seats).

The seat estimates based on this constituency-level analysis still suggest a significant improvement in Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein seat levels relative to those won by these parties and groupings in the 2011 contest (especially given that the fact that there will be eight less seats in the next Dail has been factored into this analysis), effectively pointing to significant gains on the part of the Dail opposition since 2011. The same applies to the Independents and Others, but it is worth noting that, as opposed to the parties, the Independents and Others grouping is a very broad church and includes a range of parties, groups and individuals with very different ideological perspectives, including the Socialist Party, the People Before Profit alliance and the Green Party, as well as left-leaning independents and Fianna Fail-gene pool independents. Looking at the constituencies where this grouping is predicted to win seats in this model, it can be seen that left-leaning parties and independents would take 12 of the 22 seats being assigned to this grouping.

*******************************

The changing seat numbers for the parties in the different analyses points to one reason why the Irish electoral system is not entirely one hundred percent proportional – thus underpinning the rationale behind this series of constituency level analyses of polling figures – as the manner in which constituency boundaries are drawn, or redrawn, can act to gives certain parties a significant advantage in terms of translating their vote tallies into seat wins. This knowledge, of course, formed the basis for the gerrymanders that marked the partisan boundary redrawal system which existed up to the 1977 General Election, with the party/parties in government being in a position to be able to redraw election boundaries in a manner that would allow them to pick up extra seats. In simplistic terms, in the 1960s and 1970s this amounted to the main government options seeking to create constituency units with odd-numbers of seats in the regions of the state where their support levels were highest (where a 50% share of the vote would be sufficient to allow them win 2 seats in a 3-seat constituency or 3 seats in a 5-seat constituency) and constituency units with even numbers of seats (i.e. 4-seat constituencies) where their support levels were weaker as a 40% share of the vote would be sufficient to allow them win 2 seats out of 4. Since the introduction of independent boundary commissions following the 1977 General Election, partisan influences no longer can skew the boundary drawing process in favour of a government party, or government parties, but as the example here shows a significant redrawal such as that envisaged in the 2012 Constituency Commission report will probably tend to disproportionately advantage, or disadvantage, certain parties or political groupings. Similarly, as the range of constituency level analyses prior to the 2011 General Election displayed, a party’s ability to take advantage of such disproportionality in the system, whether arising from constituency boundaries or a tendency for the Irish system to favour the larger parties, is dependent on that party maintaining its support at, or above, a certain level, as a fall in support for that party, even if relatively minimal, can lead to disproportionate level of potential seat losses if party support levels fall below a certain “tipping point”.

This concept of a “tipping point” is especially notable in the case of Fianna Fail. When the party’s support level fell below 20% in the latter part of 2010, this meant that the party – especially given its traditional catch all nature of support – was now in a position where it was struggling to win seats in a number of three-seat and four-seat constituencies, as well as five-seat constituencies in the Dublin region, where Fianna Fail support was notably weaker in 2011. The boundary changes associated with the 2012 Constituency Commission report acted to ensure the party would actually gain seats, irrespective of gains in support levels, as suggested by previous posts. With party support now over 20%, and with a very fractured political environment in which significant vote levels are being won by a number of different parties and political groupings, as opposed to the more straight-forward political landscape of the early 1980s, Fianna Fail is now in a position where it can expect to win seats in most of the larger (four and five seat) constituencies and will be competitive in most three-seat constituencies, especially in rural Ireland. This is translating into a disproportionate gain, relative to support trends, in seat levels for Fianna Fail. The level of seat gains suggested for Fianna Fail in this analysis also underpins the extent of “near misses” that the party endured in a number of constituencies at the last general election, meaning only a slight increase in support in a  number of constituencies would translate such “near misses” into seat gains, especially with the assistance of the recent boundary changes in a number of cases. Unlike Fianna Fail, Sinn Fein prospects of transforming vote gains into seat gains is stymied by the party’s weakness in certain constituencies, in which the party is likely to remain uncompetitive even if it should gain a few extra percentage points in terms of support levels. The more regional nature of the Sinn Fein support base is ideal for translating smaller levels of support into seat levels in its stronger areas, but it means the party may struggle to make the significant levels of seat gains on the basis of further increases in support that Fianna Fail could hope to make. Ultimately the political landscape of the next Dail will be determined by what levels of support these parties are standing on when the next election takes place (which could be as late as Spring 2016) but it will also be shaped by the different parties’ geographies of support, and the extent to which these support geographies might entitle these to a “bias” in terms of seat levels relative to support levels, or see the parties winning fewer seats that their support levels would suggest.

StatPlanet is an application that allows you to access, visualise and analyse all the 5000+ indicators available from the World Bank database through interactive maps and graphs.

The topics it covers include:

• Agriculture and Rural Development
• Aid Effectiveness
• Economic Policy and External Debt
• Education
• Energy and Mining
• Environment
• Financial Sector
• Gender
• Health
• Infrastructure
• Labor and Social Protection
• Poverty
• Private Sector
• Science and Technology
• Social Development
• Urban Development

By Iain McMenamin

The study of corruption and political finance in Ireland has tended to be qualitative.  This has made it difficult to determine whether problems related to a relatively small number of individuals of the system as a whole.  My article, “Business Financing of Politics in Ireland: Theory, Evidence and Reform” in the current issue of Irish Political Studies uses disclosed data to study the potential for corruption. The graph below shows some striking patterns.  Donations in general were given to both government and opposition.  By contrast, there was a clear bias towards TDs from governing parties in donations from businesses and an even stronger bias towards governing parties from the property sector.  It is highly unlikely that such donations involved a direct exchange of money for policy benefits.  However, it is very possible that such donations could underpin reciprocal exchanges, whereby TDs or their parties, might feel obliged to give extra attention to the needs of a donor business, perhaps at a time long after the donation itself.  Reciprocity is an important motivation for business donations in other jurisdictions as I show in my recently published book, If Money Talks, What Does It Say?  Corruption and Business Financing of Political Parties (Oxford 2013).

Recent legislation has made it very onerous for businesses to donate even tiny amounts to politics.  However, many business contributions to politics come disguised as individual donations or as commercial transactions.  The recent legislation also requires the parties to furnish audited accounts.  The Standards in Public Office Commission, after a period of consultation and with the consent of the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, is supposed to provide guidelines on these accounts.  In many European jurisdictions, such annual accounts provide information, on the scale, rather than the sources, of party finance.  Two really obvious ways of avoiding political donation laws are pseudo-commercial payments and pseudo-loans. In Australia, all payments to political parties over a threshold have to be disclosed, whether they are donations or not.  Even though the parties somewhat implausibly classify a small minority of payments as donations, citizens can make up their own minds by inspecting the register of payments.  In the UK, all loans and their interest rates must now be disclosed.  Previously, British parties got away with pretending big donations were loans and therefore not subject to specific disclosure.  If the guidelines require details of individual payments and loans, not just aggregates, it will go some way towards reducing the likelihood of political finance scandals in the future.

The Quality of Government Institute in Sweden has released a new cross-national and time-series dataset on. Details below

Today, a new version of the QoG standard datasets has been posted on our webpage. In the new version, 15 May 13, we have completely updated the data and added some new features to the codebook.

The Time-Series dataset with global coverage now spans the time period 1946–2012 and the cross-section year in the Cross-Section dataset has been moved from 2002 to 2009 (or the closest year available). Also, we now provide an additional separate dataset containing the year of measurement (YoM) for all the Cross-Section variables.

Each variable in the dataset has been fully revised. Hence, there might be changes made to the data not only for the last years available but to all years, as the original sources have corrected errors in their data in quite a number of cases. Also, we have used a more strict approach to the units of analysis. We no longer include data for some country-years for which we previously provided data (e.g. we no longer have data for the united Germany before the reunification).

Regarding the codebook, for each variable we have added a bar graph showing the coverage in the Time-Series dataset and a map showing the coverage in the Cross-Section dataset.

Due to the complete update we have lost some variables as they are no longer provided by the original sources. However, for the Cross-Section dataset some of the dropped variables are a result of the use of a narrower time-period when composing the Cross-Section dataset. In order to make it more suitable for contemporary analyses, the data included now refers to the year 2009 with a span of +/-3 years.

You will find detailed information about all the changes we have made in the introduction of the codebook which you find, together with the data, on our webpage:

http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata/

Posted by Eoin O’Malley (15 May)

A new Seanad reform bill was introduced in the Seanad today by Senators Katherine Zappone and Fergal Quinn. It is available here. The main point of the bill are that it should move to a reformed house with new powers, but without requiring constitutional change. It proposed elections by universal suffrage, to close the democratic deficit, with non-geographic constituencies (on these see an interesting post by Michael Gallagher here). The other reforms are to allow the Seanad conduct public inquiries, to monitor secondary legislation (Statutory Instruments), especially that which results from EU directives, to approve government appointment’s to state boards and the judiciary. These are reasonable reforms that parliaments should engage in, but one wonders why give them to the Seanad, and not the Dáil? An argument might be that the Dáil should spend its time on primary legislation. But if it doesn’t, and it doesn’t really, this should probably be the first port-of-call for reformers. But we might see here is a real separation of powers, where the Seanad has powers over certain areas, and the Dáil over others. This differs from the current, unequal, division of power between the two chambers. This would mean Ireland would not face the sort of gridlock that we see in countries with symmetrical bicameralism, such as Italy.

This aside, what about the Bill on offer? There are a number of problems with it that one might object to. None of these are fatal, and could be fixed with amendments, although the solutions could be administratively messy.

First, and most crucially, is the unequal weighting of votes across constituencies. It suggests that voters should assign themselves to the constituencies (either university seats or the panels, Agriculture, Labour, Culture, Industry and Administration). The universities have six seats in the Bill and the other panels between 8 and 10 seats each. What happens if 1m people assign themselves to the labour panel, and just 50,000 to the arts? The voters in the arts panel would be over represented compared to the others. This would contravene a principle in the constitution that there should be broadly equal representation. The solution would be to allocate seats on the basis of the number of people who register to vote in a certain constituency. It’s possible, but it would be administratively expensive.

Second, there is a very strict gender requirement that half of the Seanad should be of either sex. This is to be achieved by sub-panels made up of men and women (it’s not clear if people then have two votes, or if women must vote for women and men for men). It is proposed that there would be complete gender equality in each constituency (panel). This is rather rigid, and would be impossible to satisfy in the 9 seat constituencies they also propose.

Third, casual vacancies are to be filled by going to the next placed loser (of the right gender). This might seem odd to reward a person who failed to get elected because of the death or resignation of a person who beat them. This could disrupt the balance of the majority (although this is unlikely as the Taoiseach still retains 11 nominees – who are much more likely to be party hacks because s/he’ll have less control of the Seanad). It would be easier to allow substitutes as the European Parliament has.

Fourth, and rather radically, it suggests all passport holders should have a vote. Though we go on a bit about the diaspora we don’t tend to let them have any real say. But do we want to? Emigrants will have very different interests in the country than those who live here and pay tax and/ or use the state’s services. Might a constituency for the diaspora make more sense? But this would require constitutional change.

Fifth, There is a provision that every candidate should be approved by a ‘Judicial assessor’ – a former High Court judge (why do we think that these people are best placed to perform virtually every task that requires a measure of independence?) who will decide whether the candidate truly is an expert or has a genuine interest in the subject of the panel the candidate wishes to stand for. While I’m sure in reality this would not be problematic, it seems oddly anti-democratic and elitist to allow someone ‘approve’ who is eligible to stand as a candidate.

While there are good practical arguments for a bill that requires no constitutional change, it limits any real bicameral reform. So if we want a properly reformed second chamber why act within these limits. It will just give an imperfect outcome. Some of the problems are also as a result of it being based on the existing legislation. This may have made it easier to draft, but keeps imperfections that could easily be removed.

The arguments the anti-abolitionists are using about abolition are also flawed. Ireland will not descend into some Zimbabwe-like state with the absence of Seanad ‘checks’. Nordic countries manage with a single chamber, without this issue. The key is that in those countries the parliament is more independent of government than here.

I still find it hard to see why we should spend much time and effort on Seanad abolition or reform. There is an assumption by directly electing senators we’ll get a better calibre of senator. Oddly though, it is the appointed and university senators who have made most contribution to the Seanad, not the professional politicians. I suspect a cut in the salary of Senators to where we cover their basic expenses would lead to a more radical change in the composition of the Seanad than direct election, which could lead to making it more likely to be a mirror of the Dáil.

On the surface, two rather hopeful stories point to the benefits of politician-led political reform: 1) the development of a Seanad Reform Bill and 2) the publication of a set of proposals for Dáil reform by Eoghan Murphy TD as a discussion document for a Fine Gael parliamentary party meeting. Both point to the wherewithal of politicians in terms of arriving at concrete proposals for change based on practical experience.

I imagine (or, at least, I hope) that this was the reasoning behind the government’s decision to break with international precedent when establishing the Constitutional Convention by making a third of its (voting) membership professional politicians.

However, to those more familiar with the sclerotic Irish political system, these stories are rather less hopeful . The measures proposed in both the Seanad Reform Bill and Deputy Murphy’s document are by no means new ideas – rather they have been outlined in various (official) reports, submissions and discussions going back decades. While such changes would probably have strengthened our parliamentary institutions, they would also have upset the status quo.

Given that those charged with implementing institutional reform were the very people who most benefited from that status quo (i.e., the elected, professional politicians holding power) – it is not surprising that these good ideas were stymied. Indeed, the sole reason why we are seeing any action on Seanad reform at the moment is the impending referendum on its abolition – a change to the status quo that would negatively impact on both incumbent Senators and those TDs in marginal seats who view the Seanad as a fallback option.

This feedback loop between the rules of the political game and the fortunes of those who are winning that game at any time helps to explain why even patently dysfunctional institutions are so resistant to reform. The whole idea of a Citizens’ Assembly is to circumvent this loop, and to provide a mechanism for reform ideas to emerge without fears that they will be manipulated by a self-interested political class. However, with the Irish Convention on the Constitution mainly confined to the outer layers of what Kristof Jacobs describes as the institutional ‘onion’, it looks likely that, absent an explosion in votes for radical reform parties such as Direct Democracy Ireland, Ireland’s political class will continue to control the architecture of the political system for some time to come. Overall, this would not lead us to anticipate anything too different from what’s come before.

The book will be launched by Ms. Emily O’Reilly, Ombudsman and Information Commissioner.

LOCATION: City Hall, Dame Street, Dublin 2.
DATE: Tuesday 21st May 2013
TIME: 6pm followed by a reception
RSVP: jean.nelson@dcu.ie or phone: 01-700 8860

The Helix, Dublin City University, 12 June 2013

The debt crises in Ireland and Europe require a combination of political and economic analysis. This conference includes cutting-edge papers from leading international scholars.

9.50-10.40: Dr Lauren Phillips, London School of Economics and Political Science

Chair: Paschal Donohoe, TD

Paper: Lauren Phillips, Politics, Policy and Sovereign Debt Market Volatility in Advanced Economies

10.40-11.30: Dr Michael Bechtel, University of St Gallen

Chair: Stephen Donnelly, TD

Paper: Michael Bechtel, Jens Hainmueller, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Yotam Margalit, Columbia University, Studying Public Opinion on the Eurozone Bailouts

11.50-12.50: Prof Marc Flandreau, Graduate Institute, University of Geneva

Chair: Prof Gary Murphy, DCU

Paper:  Causes and Consequences of Bondholders’ Organizations in the Nineteenth Century: A Revisionist View and a Research Agenda

1.40-2.30: Dr Roman Goldbach, University of Dresden

Chair: Dr Tim Hicks, Trinity College Dublin

Paper: Roman Goldach and Christian Fahrholz, Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, The Euro Area’s Common Default Risk: Evidence on the Commission’s Effect on Uncertainty

2.30-3.20: Dr Iain McMenamin, DCU

Chair: Dr Niamh Hardiman, University College Dublin

Paper: Iain McMenamin, Michael Breen, Juan Muñoz-Portillo, DCU, Elections, Institutions and Sovereign Debt

3.40-4.30: Dr Joachim Wehner, London School of Economics and Political Science

Chair: Dr Donal de Buitléir, publicpolicy.ie

Paper: James Alt, Harvard University, David Lassen, University of Copenhagen and Joachim Wehner, The Politics and Economics of Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe

The conference (including lunch and coffee) is free. However, preregistration is necessary. Please email juan.munozportillo2@mail.dcu.ieto pre-register.

May 9, 2013 – Jane Suiter and Theresa Reidy co-convenors of the PSAI Voters, Parties and Elections Group are holding two events on referendums examining all elements of campaigns from a global perspective with the world’s leading experts from Canada, California, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Germany as well as Ireland contributing. With a number of referendums in the pipeline in Ireland over the coming years this is a timely opportunity to get to grips with how these campaigns work and are run in a wide variety of democracies. The events are being held at the NUI, Merrion Square and European Parliament Office, Molesworth Street on 9 May. All welcome, but please email Clara Muller at 112137430@umail.ucc.ie to register.

Full programme details available here.

New Directions in Referendums; Politics and Campaigns

One Day Conference – NUI, Merrion Square, Dublin.

Morning 10.15 – 11.15
Prof Lawrence LeDuc – University of Toronto
Referendums and Deliberative Democracy

11.30 – 1.15
Chair- Prof Gary Murphy – Dublin City University

Dr Andreas Schuck and Prof Claes de Vreese – University of Amsterdam
Public support for the use of referendums in 20 countries

Prof Michael Marsh – Trinity College Dublin
Referendums in context: Irish votes on the EU since Maastricht

Dr Stephen Quinlan and Dr Mark Shephard – University of Strathclyde
Campaign Dynamics in Independence Referendums in Quebec and Scotland:
Nationalistic or Second-order?

Dr Theresa Reidy – University College Cork and Dr Jane Suiter – Dublin City
University
The Rules of the Game, campaign regulations at referendums ?

Afternoon 2.15 – 4.30
Chair – Dr Theresa Reidy – University College Cork

Prof Shaun Bowler – University of California – Riverside
Information availability and information use in ballot proposition contes ts

Dr Johan A Elkink and Prof Richard Sinnott – University College Dublin
Political knowledge and campaign effects in the Irish vote on the Lisbon Trea ty

Dr Daniel Bochsler – University of Zurich and Prof Simon Hug – University of
Geneva
How minorities fare under referendums. A cross national study

Prof Thorsten Faas – Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz and Prof Rüdiger
Schmitt-Beck – Universität Mannheim
Campaign Communication in Comparison

Roundtable Discussion

Europe Day 2013

European Parliament Office – Dublin

5 – 7    European Year of the Citizens, an analysis of 40 years of direct democracy in the EU

Chair – Prof David Farrell (University College Dublin)

Prof Michael Marsh, Prof Lawrence LeDuc, Dr Jane Suiter, Dr Johan A Elkink, Dr Andreas Schuck

7        Wine Reception